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MATHEMATICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SCORING 
PARAMETERS IN CAPPED TENDERING 
Abstract 
Mathematical relationships between Scoring Parameters can be used in Economic Scoring 
Formulas (ESF) in tendering to distribute the score among bidders in the economic part of a 
proposal. 
Each contracting authority must set an ESF when publishing tender specifications and the 
strategy of each bidder will differ depending on the ESF selected and the weight of the 
overall proposal scoring. 
This paper introduces the various mathematical relationships and density distributions that 
describe and inter-relate not only the main Scoring Parameters but the main Forecasting 
Parameters in any capped tender (those whose price is upper-limited). 
Forecasting Parameters, as variables that can be known in advance before the deadline of a 
tender is reached, together with Scoring Parameters constitute the basis of a future Bid 
Tender Forecasting Model. 
Keywords: bid; tender; auction; construction; scoring system. 
1. Introduction 
Competitive bidding is a transparent procurement method in which bids from competing 
contractors, suppliers, or vendors are invited by openly advertising the scope, specifications, 
and terms and conditions of the proposed contract as well as the criteria by which the bids 
will be evaluated. 
Research in the area of competitive bidding strategy models has been in progress since the 
1950s (Deltas & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 2005; Dikmen et al., 2007; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 
1980, 1989; Harstad & Saša Pekec, 2008; Lo et al. 2007; Naoum, 1994; Näykki, 1976; 
Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994; Rothkopf, 1969; Ye et al., 2008). Competitive bidding aims at 
obtaining goods and services at the lowest prices by stimulating competition, and by 
preventing favoritism. Competitive bidding strategy models have been developed to predict 
the probability of a bidder winning an auction (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1980; Näykki, 1976). 
However most of these models are based on the theory of Games, Decision Analysis and 
Operational Research and are difficult to apply to real-world business contexts because of 
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the complex mathematical formulations used in the models (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1980; 
Harstad & Saša Pekec, 2008; Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994). 
Because of the multiple technical and financial criteria involved in public tendering 
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1980; Fayek, 1998; Harstad & Saša Pekec, 2008; Näykki, 1976; 
Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994; Skitmore & Drew, 2001; Skitmore, 2002, 2004), there is still a 
need for the development of new tools that help decision makers to improve the selection 
process of candidate contractors (Watt et al., 2009). 
A new practical tool was presented in Ballesteros-Pérez et al, 2011 that can help potential 
bidders improve their competitive bidding strategies and increase their chances of winning a 
contract. This tool, called iso-Score Curves Graph (iSCG), is the first out of four graphs that 
will enable bidders to place their bids using simple statistical procedures based on previous 
bidding experiences. 
This paper describes the relationships between the main variables of the model called 
“Scoring Parameters (SP)”. These variables use Economic Scoring Formulas (ESF) to 
distribute the points of the economic section in a tender among the different economic bids 
proposed by the bidders. These mathematical relationships can be graphically represented 
using an iSCG to observe the goodness of fit of the statistical relationships and deviations in 
a historical database of past tenders. These mathematical relationships play an essential 
role in the tendering process since, once one of the Scoring Parameters (SP) is known the 
other parameters can be easily calculated. 
Additionally, certain “Forecasting Parameters” (FP) closely related to the SPs can be 
calculated before the deadline of a tender. In this connection, the estimation of the value of 
an FP allows determining which competitors’ Bids can be statistically expected (through SP 
Forecasting). 
2. Background 
An extensive literature exists about the theory of auctions and competitive bidding for 
contract tendering. Most of the models, however, are based on theoretical assumptions that 
are difficult to apply to real cases (Skitmore, 2008). Bidding theory and strategy models (see 
Stark and Rothkopf, 1979, for an early bibliography) frequently make use of the so-called 
‘the statistical hypothesis’ as auction bids are assumed to contain statistical properties such 
as fixed parameters and randomness (Skitmore, 2002). 
The first studies (e.g., Friedman, 1956) assumed that each bidder drew bids from a 
probability distribution unique to that bidder, with low-frequency bidders being pooled as a 
special case. Pim (1974) analyzed a number of projects awarded to four USA construction 
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companies. His study indicated that the average number of projects awarded is proportional 
to the reciprocal of the average number of bidders competing - the proportion that would be 
expected to be won by pure 'chance' alone. That suggested an extremely simple ‘equal 
probability’ model in which the expected probability of entering the lowest bid in a k-size 
auction, that is, an auction in which k bidders enter bids, is the reciprocal of k. 
McCaffer and Pettitt (1976) and Mitchell (1977) assumed non-unique and homogeneous 
probability distributions, enabling a suitable distribution shape to be empirically fitted 
(uniform, in the case of McCaffer and Pettitt) and the derivation of other statistical 
distributions based on an assumed (normal) density function. 
Since then, different models have been developed to calculate the probability, Pr(m), of 
individual contestants winning a bidding auction (Skitmore et al., 2007); some of such 
models are Friedman’s (Friedman, 1956), Gates’ (Gates, 1967), Carr’s (Carr, 1982) and 
Skitmore’s (Skitmore, 1991) models, among others. These models are based on the same 
statistical model differing only in their method of parameter estimation. 
In the context of construction contract bidding, it is difficult to collect the necessary data of 
each bidder for predictions to be effective (Skitmore, 2002). Besides, Skitmore showed that 
the homogeneity assumption (Skitmore, 1991) was not a valid approach for predicting the 
probability of lowest bidders (Skitmore, 2002) and Runeson and Skitmore (1999) criticized 
the use of heterogeneous models based on fixed parameters. 
The mathematical relationships described in this paper can be used by bidders to represent 
historical bidding datasets as a way of inferring patterns of competitors’ behavior. Unlike 
other models based on probabilistic description of groups of single bidders, the proposed Bid 
Tender Forecasting Model or BTFM hereinafter (which will be completely described in 
upcoming publications) describes group patterns while bidding. 
The proposed model solves the major problems encountered in previous models as it allows 
beneficiaries to (1) Study bidding behaviors with a significant small database compared to 
previous works; (2) Forecast the probability of obtaining a particular position among 
competitors, and (3) Analyze time variations between tenders (Skitmore & Runeson, 2006). 
Furthermore, other formal and analytical risk models have recently been developed to 
prescribe how risk is to be incorporated into construction bids (Hartono & Yap, 2011; 
Mohamed et al., 2011; Oo et al., 2008), in practice, price risks are usually excluded from the 
final bid to improve competitiveness (Laryea & Hughes, 2011). Future works about the 
BTFM will consider risk issues through the analysis of the different probability levels resulting 
from the combination of potential bids. Nevertheless future research will have to be 
developed in order to study the causes of those parameter variations. 
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However, due to the lack of space needed to describe the whole BTFM, in this paper only 
the major mathematical basis will be shown. The equations shown later, combined with the 
first model’s tool: the iso-Score Curves Graph (iSCG) (Ballesteros-Pérez et al, 2011), will 
enable the bidding data and their more likely upcoming Bidders’ Bid behaviors to be 
represented in a convenient manner. 
3. Basic definitions  
This work uses the Spanish tendering terminology as the study was carried out in Spain, 
although some new terms are included. The BTFM described in this paper has been applied 
to capped tenders, that is, tenders upper-limited to the contracting authority estimate stated 
in the tender specifications. 
However, the expressions shown below are not only restricted to this type of tender. If the 
main mathematical relationships between SPs and FPs are re-written to leave out the tender 
amount/price (A), the equations shown below could also be used for both capped and non-
capped tenders, since this latter type of tender is the most common in many countries 
For the sake of clarity, some terms used in this paper are going to be previously defined (see 
Appendix A for further information). 
“Economic Scoring Formula” (ESF) refers to the mathematical expressions used to assign 
numerical scores to each bidder from its bid price expressed on a monetary-unit basis. ESF 
comprises the mathematical operations that provide the score and the mathematical 
expression that determines which bids are abnormal or risky (Abnormally Low Bids Criteria 
(ALBC). ALBC has received much less attention in the literature than the analysis of 
contractors’ bidding behaviors (Chao & Liou, 2007). 
“Scoring Parameter”(SP). SPs are the variables used in ESFs. They are calculated from the 
distribution of the bids participating in a tender contest. 
“Bidder’s Drop (D). It is the discount or bid reduction in the initial price of a contract (A) 
submitted by a given contractor i for a particular capped tender. It is mathematically 
expressed as: 
      
  
 
 (1) 
Where Di is the Drop (expressed in per-unit values) of bidder “i”, Bi is the Bid (expressed in 
monetary values) of bidder “i”, and A is the initial Amount of money (in monetary values) of 
the Tender (generally set by the Public Administration or contractor in many countries). 
In Spanish tendering practice, when referring to bid amounts, it is usual to use a discount on 
the contract value A. This discount is called ‘baja’ in Spanish, meaning literally fall or drop. 
 7 
This term has been translated merely as ‘Drop’ because no similar concept has been found 
in the international bibliography. 
The ESF scores are obtained either using the bidders’ bids (Bi) in monetary values or 
converting Bidders’ bids into Drops (Di) in per-unit values. However, for the comparison of 
bids in different bidding processes with different initial bid amounts (A) for each tender, it is 
preferable to use Drops (Di) than Monetary-based Bids (Bi). 
The SPs have been classified into two groups: Primary SPs and Secondary SPs. Primary 
SPs are base-line or reference parameters from which the Secondary SPs are calculated. 
The Primary SPs are:  
 Mean Drop, “Dm”; It is the mean value of the Bid Drops submitted by the total number 
of bidders admitted in a particular tender contest. The relation with the Mean Bid (Bm) 
in monetary value is:    ( -  )  . 
 Maximum Drop, “Dmax”; it is the per-unit Drop corresponding to the Lowest Bid 
submitted by the bidders. Its relation with the Minimum Bid (Bmin) in monetary value 
is:       ( -    )  . 
 Minimum Drop, “Dmin”; it is the per-unit Drop corresponding to the Maximum Bid 
submitted by the bidders. Its relation with the Maximum Bid (Bmax) in monetary value 
is:      ( -    )  . 
 Drops’ Standard Deviation, (Drops’ stdev), “σ”; in certain tenders it is typical to 
express Abnormally Low Bids Criteria (ALBC) on a percent or multiple basis relative 
to the Standard deviation values of the bids. Its relation with Bids’ Standard Deviation 
(S) (Bids’ stdev) in monetary value is:        . 
The second group of SPs consists of the Secondary SP. As mentioned above, they result 
from the calculation of one or more primary SPs. For simplicity, only the main Secondary SP 
used in the upcoming model is described: 
 Abnormal Drop “Dabn” is the Drop Threshold value; bids below this threshold value 
will be considered abnormal or risky. The Abnormal Drop is calculated through a 
formula that includes some primary SPs such as Dm (for example, a certain 
percentage value lower than the Mean Drop). Its relation with Abnormal Bid (Babn) in 
monetary value is      ( -    )  . When Dabn is calculated as a relative distance T 
(in per-unit values) from Dm, the expression is       -( - )( -  ) and when it is 
calculated as a constant distance T from Dm, the expression is           . 
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Primary and Secondary SPs are combined mathematically to generate specific ESFs for 
each specific tender and should be clearly specified in the tender specifications and contract 
conditions by the employer. 
Additionally, a third group of variables includes: 
“Forecasting Parameter”(FP). FP refers to the variables that can be known in advance 
before the deadline of a tender. Their values must be closely related to the SPs to be useful. 
In this study the variable “Estimated Cost” (D0) is used as a FP calculated in per-unit Drop 
rather than in monetary value. 
Although some other variables, such as GDP, have been used in other models to make 
predictions they have always shown weaker connections with the SPs used in the 
forthcoming model. 
4. Fieldwork 
A total of 120 real tender documents of Spanish Public Administrations and private 
companies were analyzed in order to obtain the Scoring Parameters (SPs) and Economic 
Scoring Formulas (ESFs) used in the comparison model. 
The dataset collected and analyzed can be considered as representative of a public capped 
tender process as it comprises: Tender contests and Auctions, all kinds of public 
administrations (city councils, local councils, semi-public entities, universities, ministries, and 
so on), a great variety of civil engineering works and services, representation of different 
geographical regions (including the islands) and a wide range of Tender Amounts. Although 
the sample only contains Spanish tender documents, the ESFs and SPs analyzed are 
applicable to any country where the Administration sets up an initial Tender Amount (A) 
against which candidates will underbid (capped tendering or upper-limited-price tendering). 
The specification of an initial Amount A in the tender document allows bidders to underbid 
the initial offer. The mathematical relationships presented in this paper work well with both 
Tender Amounts (A) and Bid Drops (discount given by a bidder to a Tender Amount). The 
examples presented here have been calculated using Bid Drops expressed in per-unit 
values. 
Among the wide range of tender documents collected (see Ballesteros-Pérez, 2010, Annex 
I), several Public Administrations generated a large enough number of tendering processes 
to permit an in-depth statistical analysis. Although the results obtained from those Public 
Administrations were invariably very similar, a sub-dataset from a particular Public 
Administration (see Ballesteros-Pérez, 2010, Annex II) was selected in order to illustrate the 
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mathematical relationships between the SPs and one FP (Estimated Cost or D0 , in this 
case) through a numerical example. 
The selected Public Administration is the “Agencia Catalana del Agua” (Catalonian Water 
Agency), ACA hereinafter, a semi-Public Administration which manages most of the water 
supply system in the four Spanish Catalonian provinces. ACA managed fifty-one 
construction tenders in approximate one year (from May 2007 to June 2008) and used the 
same ESFs in the tender specifications.  
In order to avoid misleading results, tenders with less than three bidders were removed from 
ACA’s dataset, leaving a total of forty-five tenders. (Table 1 in Appendix B shows ACA’s 
dataset). Besides, taking into account that each dataset sets certain numerical values to 
some correlation coefficients (called a, b and c), the purpose of representing only a sub-
dataset is not to mix results from heterogeneous sources, that is, with different ESFs and 
SPs. 
To sum it up, the dataset analyzed was large enough to draw conclusions from countries in 
which a tender amount A is pre-set by the employer, but only a little part of the 
aforementioned dataset has been shown here (mainly in Tables 1 and 3), especially to allow 
representing homogeneous graphs with sufficient data points in them. 
5. Relationships between SPs 
Many studies in the literature are aimed at determining bidders’ bidding behavior patterns. 
The classical approach in Bid Tender forecasting models is based on the aggregation of 
particular probabilistic behaviors of particular bidders in a major model that could predict 
which bidders are going to bid. 
The main problems of these models are the large amounts of data belonging to individual 
bidders that have to be analyzed in order to find out which bidders would probably bid in 
forthcoming tenders, the big amount of data required to describe each bidder’s behavior and 
the way of predicting which bidders will take part in forthcoming tender processes. Besides, 
there is a real difficulty in identifying how bidders’ behavior changes in the course of tenders 
because even more data would be needed. 
Since none of these problems has been successfully addressed yet, this paper proposes an 
alternative way of approaching the problem, namely to study bidders’ behavior as a whole, 
that is, to study their descriptive parameters but as a group by means of Scoring 
Parameters, such as Mean Drop, Minimum Drop, Maximum Drop and so on. This approach 
enables obviating the “name” of the bidders that will take part in forthcoming auctions or 
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tenders as well as using a substantially smaller dataset of previous tenders. In upcoming 
papers where the Bid Tender Forecasting Model (BTFM) will be explained in detail, it will 
also be shown how temporary changes in these parameters are significantly easier to detect 
and monitor than changes in a single bidders’ behavior separately. 
As the paper shows, though a complete study comprising a large number of different Public 
Administration tenders was conducted, for the sake of illustration only a sub-dataset from 
one particular Public Administration (ACA) is presented in the present paper. 
The data shown in Table 1 (Appendix B) are represented in a graph where the X-axis 
represents the values of the SP mean Drop (Dm) and the Y-axis represents the Dmax’s, Dmin’s, 
σ’s and Dm’s (again) actual values of each tendering process. That means that each X value 
represents a single tender in which each Y value is given by the real SPs (Dmax, Dm , Dmin, 
and σ) which led to that tender after the bids (in this case converted to Drops in per-unit 
values) were known, i.e., after the bids were opened. 
 
Figure 1: Representation of actual values of SPs from Table 1 (Appendix B): Dmin . Dmax and 
σ from previous ACA’s Tenders 
Different mathematical expressions were tested for the regression analysis, two groups of 
which were, by far, the best correlated:  
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a) Potential expressions 
       
   ;            ;     (         )         (2, 3, 4) 
b) Parabolic expressions 
        
  (   )    ;          
  (   )    ;     (      )  (5, 6, 7) 
The regression expressions of Dmax and Dmin are curves that cross the points (X, Y) = (Dm, 
Dmax or Dmin) = (0,0) and (1,1). This happens due to two basic mathematical assumptions 
that correspond to boundary conditions:  
1. When the Mean Drop is zero, that is, none of the bidders have underbid the Tender 
Amount A; Dmin cannot be negative (because overbidding A is usually forbidden when 
a Tender Amount has been preset) so it has to be zero too; then Dmax cannot have a 
value other than zero, otherwise, Dm could not be zero. This fact finally means that 
the three regression curves must coincide at point (0,0). 
2. When the Mean Drop is 1 (an extreme condition in which all the bidders have 
submitted a completely free bid), Dmax cannot be higher than 1 (because “any Drop 
equals 1” means offering a zero price, that is, the price offered is completely free); 
then Dmin cannot have a value other than 1, otherwise Dm could not be 1. Again, any 
regression curve represented in the selected X and Y axes, must coincide at point 
(1,1). 
On the other hand, the two expressions of σ must be a curve that passes through the 
following points: (X, Y) = (Dm, σ) = (0,0) and (1,0). In this case the explanation is easier, in 
these two points Dm=Dmin=Dmax , there is no dispersion in Drops and, therefore, there cannot 
be any σ-value different from zero. 
However each group of equations has pros and cons: 
a) Potential expressions show the best Correlation factors but the differences between 
estimated and actual data do not respond to any known Probability Density Function. 
b) Parabolic expressions have Correlation factors almost as high as Potential 
expressions but they do generate a Normal Distribution between estimated and 
actual data (only known after the tenders’ results are published with a detailed list of 
bidders’ bids), which will lead to a considerably easier and less complex BTFM 
mathematical body. 
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Of course, there are many other mathematical expressions that can somehow improve 
correlation, but all of them require fitting more than one variable. By contrast, the two groups 
of expressions mentioned above have the great advantage of using only one variable (a, b 
and c respectively to Dmax, Dmin and σ), which greatly simplifies the calculation process not 
avoiding linear approximations as well. 
Hence, it is recommended to use potential expressions when there are very few previous 
tenders, for instance, less than 3, and parabolic expressions for historical data with more 
than 2 tenders. Therefore, as a general rule, parabolic expressions are preferred in BTFM 
models when the final number of bidders is unknown. 
5.1. Calculation of the coefficients and their Correlation factors 
To fit the parabolic curves shown in the previous section in any dataset, it is necessary to 
calculate the values of coefficients a, b and c from equations 5, 6 and 7. These coefficients 
were calculated as follows for the ACA’s sub-dataset. 
Given the data from a tender “k” (bidder’s bids must be known), that is, given the values of 
Dm k, Dmax k, Dmin k and σk , the coefficients a, b and c can be easily calculated with the 
following expressions: 
   
          
    
      
  ;     
          
    
      
  ;     
  
  
    
     (8, 9, 10) 
Once these coefficients (a, b and c) were obtained for all available previous tenders, their 
average and standard deviation values were calculated (Table 1, Appendix B). 
The coefficient values calculated by means of equations 8, 9 and 10 (Table 1, Appendix B) 
were used to generate Table 2 (Appendix B) and Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Representation of actual values from Table 1 (Appendix B) and Parabolic 
Regression Curves of Dmin, Dmax and σ. 
In the previous figure it can be observed that the parabolic curves fit actual data (the Dmax, 
Dmin, Dm and σ values that really happened) fairly well, however, to assign numerical values, 
correlation factors (R and R2) were calculated for each kind of curve (Dmin ,Dmax and σ) 
(Table 3, Appendix B). Summarizing, the correlation factors of Dmax and Dmin are about 90%, 
but σ-curves can be further improved (R= 43%). It must be taken into account that the tender 
sub-dataset used includes different construction works, and this fact introduces a certain 
degree of heterogeneity in the values. 
A final SP worth mentioning is Dabn , which is a Secondary Scoring Parameter. This SP can 
be calculated in different ways depending on the tender conditions. The more usual way of 
calculating this parameter is through an expression directly related to Dm , for example 
      -( - )( -  ) or            , where T is called “Abnormally High Drop 
Threshold” and is a numerical value usually set by the Public Administration in the case of 
Spain within a range of values between 0.05 and 0.20 (0.10 is the value set up in the 
Spanish Public Procurement Law). 
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Since Dabn is directly obtained from any given value of the SP Dm there is no need to search 
for regression curves, and, obviously, there will be no deviations between actual and 
estimated data. 
5.2. Checking Normality assumption of variation 
An important advantage of parabolic curves is that they allow the study of the deviations 
between estimated and actual values of Dmax and Dmin, as if they were distributed according 
to a Normal Distribution Function. 
To check this assumption and taking into account that each homogeneous sample rarely 
contains more than fifty values (not only this sub-dataset but every dataset from most 
employers’ tenders before they introduce a change in their ESFs), two Shapiro-Wilk tests 
(Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) were used to check for normality between estimated and actual data 
for the expressions of Dmax and Dmin. (both in our sub-dataset and the rest of tenders 
analyzed in Spain). 
Whereas the Shapiro-Wilk test for Dmax accomplishes the condition of exceeding the 
statistical test parameter Wtab for α=5%, Dmin is on the edge. This is due to the fact that Dmin-
values have an under-limitation, that is, Dmin values can never be negative so there is a 
constraint that affects the Normality assumption. However, it has been verified that in 
tenders where bidders can bid over the initial Tender Amount (where Dmin-values can be 
negative) the Normal Distribution assumption is fulfilled. Moreover, if Dmin’s extreme values 
were not taken into account, Shapiro-Wilk tests would be fulfilled as well. 
The procedure used to solve this problem was very simple: the Normal distribution of Dmin 
curves is accepted until they reach zero-values, then, the rest of the probability’s tail of the 
Normal Distribution Function is assigned to “Drops = 0”. 
Finally, whereas the Dmax and Dmin curves cross the clouds of actual Tenders’ Dmax and Dmin 
values generating Normal Distribution data on both sides of the average curves, this does 
not happen in the σ-curves. None of the Shapiro-Wilk tests used so far in a wide variety of 
mathematical expressions has ever fulfilled this condition, nor have they ever shown a high 
enough Correlation factor. 
Since SP σ is not as important as SPs Dmax and Dmin, ongoing research is currently checking 
different tentative mathematical expressions for the forthcoming BTFM model, like the 
expression shown in equation 7. 
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6. Relationships between SPs and FPs 
For the design of a Bid Tender Forecasting Model (BTFM) it is necessary to correlate the 
variables used in the model. Basically there are two kinds of variables: Scoring Parameters 
(SP) and Forecasting Parameters (FP). 
SPs were described above so that their range of values can be estimated provided the 
values of at least one SP were. This can be considered a kind of forensic analysis in the 
sense that the values of the SPs can be known once the tender has finished, but not before. 
To predict the values of these SPs new variables, called “Forecasting Parameters”, will have 
to be used. 
“Forecasting Parameters” (FP) are variables that can be known before the deadline of the 
tender offering is reached and that show the relationship with the SPs. Therefore, to 
estimate the value of a FP it will suffice to know which competitors’ Bids can be statistically 
expected (through SP Forecasting). Of course, the identification of good FPs is the most 
difficult issue in a BTFM. 
Some recent conceptual models have been developed for use by contractors as part of a 
more reliable approach to identify key competitors and as a basis for formulating bidding 
strategies (Oo et al., 2008a, 2010). Competitiveness between bids is examined with linear 
mixed models that use variables such as project type and size, work sector; work nature; 
market conditions and number of bidders (Oo, et al., 2008a, 2008b). Some of these 
variables can be considered FPs (project type and size, work sector; work nature; market 
conditions) but they are difficult to quantify. 
In this work, in an effort to keep the BTFM as simple as possible, “Estimated Cost” (B0) has 
been chosen as the best possible FP. This monetary value is converted into a Drop-value, 
called D0, by means of the expression    ( -  )  , that is, a linear expression but only 
when the SPs and FP are expressed in Drops (never in monetary values). 
D0 is the Drop below which one bidder makes profit (offering a lower Drop value means 
offering a bigger amount of money with a higher mark-up for the bidder) and above which 
the bidder loses money (offering a higher Drop value means offering a smaller amount of 
money to increase the chances of winning a tender). 
There are techniques to forecast tight prices for a particular construction work or a singular 
project based on the experience of an organization, its resources and available personnel, 
inflation rates since the last time a similar action was performed, the situation of the 
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contracting Administration and even on the situation of the country which receives the 
tender’s action (Thomas, et al., 2004). Recently several studies which combine statistical 
regression analysis with Temporary Series have been conducted. Temporary series allow 
bidders to estimate with certain degree of accuracy how much it will cost to execute a 
particular work or project (Thomas, et al., 2004). 
Consulting and Construction companies need to control their cost in order to obtain benefits 
when they accept a contract (Naoum, 1994). There are several methodologies to monitor 
and estimate costs: 
x Initial approaches were based on subjective correlations between the elements and 
composition of the Construction Works (Touran, 1993) (for example, between the 
volume of Civil Works, Electromechanical equipment and Electrical Equipment) to 
estimate cost by means of inaccurate correlations that require relatively few 
calculations. 
x Several methodologies are related to the features of the work to be done (Lowe et 
al., 2006) 
x Other methodologies are based on the volume (Remer & Buchanan, 2000) and time 
(Pellicer, 2005) of resources involved. 
x Some models combine the two previous concepts through indices (Chang, 2001) 
x More recently, logarithmic regression techniques combined with fuzzy variables have 
been developed as well (Hong, 2004). They are also applied to recommend a mark-
up obviating the possible mark-ups from other competitors (Fayek, 1998). 
x Other models have been developed to predict costs in the early stages of project 
execution once a company has been awarded a contract (Trost & Oberlender, 2003) 
x The latest approaches focus on the design of models that scale cost estimates with a 
view to bid with higher accuracy according to the real market situation (Oo et al., 
2008a), taking into account the current situation of the proposing company (Touran & 
Lopez, 2006) and the economic volume of the tender (Drew & Skitmore, 1997). 
The list presented above does not attempt to be comprehensive but to serve as an 
illustration.  
 17 
With respect to variable D0, the only aspect significant enough is that this variable must 
always be calculated in the same way, which means: 
x Being calculated by the same person or the same group of people using the same 
criteria. 
x Aggregating the same type of costs every time (taxes, indirect costs, structure cost 
from the company, and so on). If some of these costs are neglected or left out, it is 
recommended to keep the same criteria while calculating forthcoming D0-values. 
x If a desired level of profit is included in D0, the following times D0 is calculated it must 
include the same profit’s percentage. 
x The type of works and the ESF must be the same in every case. When these items 
experience an important change, the historical data of D0 will be deleted and it will be 
necessary to start from scratch correlating D0 with the SPs for future tenders. 
In other words, both accuracy and homogeneity while estimating cost are important, even if 
this cost is different for each company. 
Next section describes the statistical relationship between D0 and the SPs presented before. 
In table 1 (Appendix B) some D0-values are shown. These values were taken from a 
company which bided for 14 out of the 45 tenders in the list. 
6.1. Calculation of the coefficient and Correlation factor 
The proposed mathematical expression is a line which crosses point (X, Y) = (Dm, D0) = (1,1) 
and the equation is: 
                (    )         (11) 
Where coefficient “d” is calculated in a given tender “k” as: 
              
      
      
          (12) 
That is, working out the value of “d” in equation 11. 
The equation proposed crosses point (1,1) because whenever an estimated cost is equal to 
zero, the Mean Bid (Dm) will be relatively very close to zero as well. In other words, if it 
happened that a tender had an extremely low estimated cost (Drop close to 1) the margin for 
profits every bidder would decide to include in their respective bid (since the margin for profit 
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is a relative variable not an absolute variable) would have to decrease as long as the 
contract price approaches zero. At point (1,1) the estimated cost of a tender would be 
completely free, which would mean that even applying a high percentage of profit to the bid, 
the bid would continue being free (Drop equals 1) and, finally, the average of bidders’ bids 
(Mean Bid, Dm) would be 1 again. 
This assumption simplifies again the equation from two variables to only a single variable, 
“d”. 
The values of dk are shown on the right column of Table 1 (Appendix B); the regression 
curves of D0 are listed in the three right columns of Table 2 (Appendix B), and the estimated 
values of D0 and correlation factors between D0 and Dm are shown in Table 3 (Appendix B). 
Figure 3 shows the plot of the average D0-curve plus its two confidence intervals of standard 
deviation. 
 
Figure 3: Representation of actual values from Table 1 (Appendix B) and Linear Regression 
Curves of D0. 
The Correlation factor this time is equal to 54%. It might not be considered a particularly high 
value, but it must be taken into account that different kinds of construction works are 
involved, for example, if Tender with ID #10 is removed (because it involves only the 
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construction of Sewer Systems, while the others involve the construction of either WWTPs or 
WWTPs plus Sewer Systems) the correlation factor rises up to 60%. In many other studies 
carried out by the authors, the correlation factor rises up to 90% when the determination of 
estimated costs is very narrow (for example, in some Exploitation and Maintenance 
Services). 
6.2. Checking Normality assumption of variation 
Even considering correlation factors around 54%, again this mathematical relationship has 
the advantage that deviations between D0 and Dm actual values follow a Normal Probability 
Distribution Function (but remember again that this only happens when the parameters are 
expressed in Drops not in monetary values), which enables easily integrating this 
mathematical expression in a future BTFM. 
Another Shapiro-Wilk (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) test was applied to the estimated D0 and actual 
Dm values. As Wcal-value exceeded Wtab value with α =5%, so Normal distribution between 
these two variables is acceptable. 
In Figure 4 the dispersion of Dm data is represented in a graph where the X-axis represents 
Do-values. 
 
Figure 4: Representation of actual Dm-values’ dispersion. 
Once the relationship between D0 and Dm has been identified, D0 can be mathematically 
correlated to any of the other SPs, that is the BTFM’s basis. 
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7. Conclusions and Discussion 
Several mathematical and statistical relationships between Scoring Parameters, particularly 
Primary Scoring Parameters, have been described in this paper when expressed in Drop 
values. Subsequently, a Forecasting Parameter was introduced and its relationship with the 
SPs was determined. 
The obtained Correlation Coefficients were reasonably high in almost every relationship 
except for the tentative relationship between σ and Dm. 
The Probability Distribution Functions obtained were Normal Distribution Functions in most 
cases when parabolic and linear functions are used to determine the relationships between 
Scoring and Forecasting Parameters respectively. 
The relative simplicity of the mathematical expressions proposed in this work with only one 
coefficient to be determined in each relationship, the simple calculation procedure used to 
estimate these coefficients and variables, and the description of SPs’ variation through a 
standard distribution function allow fitting regression curves and density distribution functions 
to any new tender dataset using basic, simple and direct calculations, even in cases with few 
previous historical data. 
Other mathematical expressions will be used in the future to improve the obtained 
correlation coefficient values in this study, although the relationships shown in this paper are 
accurate enough to be used in a general Bid Tender Forecasting Model with a relatively 
basic background in tendering and statistical analysis. 
Nevertheless, the BTFM that will be presented will not be universal, since it will be based on 
the expressions shown in this paper that have only been applied to capped tendering. 
Many countries use capped tendering procedures when they publish their contracts to 
potential contractors. This is the case of Spain, but there are a large number of other 
countries which use both capped and non-capped tenders depending on either the kind of 
contract or the existence of a previous project which estimates an initial monetary amount.  
However, the results obtained in this paper are equally applicable to any country that uses 
capped tendering, because the parameters will be exactly the same only differing in their 
specific numerical values in each type of contract with a particular Economic Scoring 
Formula and economic environment. Nonetheless, non-capped tendering is most common in 
many countries so the expressions stated above will have to be finally adapted. 
Fortunately, the different variables of the model can be transformed to be set as a function of 
monetary values instead of drop values, which is indispensable in non-capped tendering. 
The next aim is to transform the main mathematical relationships between Scoring 
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Parameters so that they can work without a pre-set tender amount against which the bidders 
can only underbid. 
Whereas capped tendering can use drops (X-axis values ranging from 0 to 1), non-capped 
tendering will have to use semi-infinite ranges of values on the X-axis (prices ranging from 0 
to infinite). Moreover, both capped and non-capped tendering will share some boundary 
conditions regarding SPs, therefore, the adaption can be researched. 
Once the expressions are generated for non-capped tendering, every possible contract will 
be able to be forecast without further problems. 
8. Future work  
The statistical relationships described in this paper correspond to the second part of a larger 
Bid Tender Forecasting Model (BTFM). While the first part consisted of the development of 
the iso-Score Curves Graph (iSCG) (Ballesteros-Pérez, et. al, 2011), in the third part, based 
on the relationships and parameters presented in this paper the iso-Score Curves will be 
used again to generate two types of new graphs very useful to make predictions: (1) the 
Scoring Probability Graph and (2) the Position Probability Graph. 
Given any capped tender specifications and for every possible Drop (or monetary value) the 
Scoring Probability Graph will represent the probabilities of exceeding every economic 
score. 
The Position Probability Graph will state the chances of occupying every possible position 
for every Drop or monetary bid proposed by any potential bidder, given several probabilistic 
values about the number of bidders who will take part in a tender. 
The complete BTFM will be useful for both bidders and contractors to predict different 
bidding scenarios based on capped tender specifications. 
Appendix A 
Main abbreviations used in the text: 
A  Amount of money of a Tender (price’s upper limitation) 
a  regression coefficient to adjust the relationship between Dmax and Dm 
ALB Abnormally Low Bid 
ALBC Abnormally Low Bid Criteria 
B  Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
b  regression coefficient to adjust the relationship between Dmin and Dm 
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Bi  Bidder i Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
Bm  Mean Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
Bmax Highest Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
Bmin Lowest Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
BTFM Bid Tender Forecasting Model 
c  regression coefficient to adjust the relationship between either σ and Dm (in the case 
of parabolic curves) or between σ and Dmax and Dmin (in the case of potential curves) 
D  Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dabn Abnormal Drop 
Di  Bidder i Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dm  Mean Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dmax Maximum Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dmin Minimum Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
ESF Economic Scoring Formula 
iSC iso-Score Curve 
iSCG iso-Score Curve Graph 
S  Bids’ Standard Deviation (expressed in monetary value) 
Si  Score of Bidder i (expressed either in points or in per-unit value) 
SP  Scoring Parameter 
T  Abnormally High Drop Threshold 
WWTP Waste Water Treatment Plant 
σ  Drops’ Standard Deviation (expressed in per-unit value) 
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Appendix B 
 
Tender 
Code ID Tender Deadline 
EPW 
(*1) 
Nature of 
Work (*2) 
Tender 
Amount (€) N Dmin Dm Dmax σ Do 
a 
(Dmax) 
b 
(Dmin) 
c 
(σ) 
d 
(Do) 
CT08001116 1 2008-06-16 0.40 WWTP+SW 6,131,465.05 € 13 0.0000 0.1111 0.2013 0.0589 0.0700 -0.9133 1.1250 0.1594 1.0463 
CT07002839 2 2008-05-20 0.40 WWTP 819,065.86 € 4 0.0010 0.0536 0.1149 0.0591 0.1280 -1.2077 1.0369 0.1826 0.9214 
CT08000938 3 2008-05-20 0.40 SW 310,330.37 € 14 0.0100 0.0735 0.1476 0.0477   -1.0870 0.9325 0.1381   
CT08000941 4 2008-05-20 0.40 ELEC 138,782.77 € 3 0.0902 0.1162 0.1643 0.0417   -0.4686 0.2535 0.1122   
CT07002792 5 2008-05-08 0.40 WWTP 1,170,445.54 € 11 0.0000 0.0748 0.1353 0.0493 -0.1670 -0.8735 1.0809 0.1423 1.2614 
CT08000553 6 2008-04-28 0.40 WWTP+SW 744,935.13 € 5 0.0000 0.0421 0.0803 0.0369 -0.1800 -0.9473 1.0439 0.1208 1.2318 
CT08000597 7 2008-04-28 0.40 WWTP 966,499.89 € 6 0.0515 0.0862 0.1515 0.0379 0.0010 -0.8280 0.4403 0.1067 1.0933 
CT08000389 8 2008-03-31 0.40 WWTP 4,745,844.66 € 22 0.0514 0.1813 0.2732 0.0491 0.1170 -0.6193 0.8751 0.1277 1.0786 
CT07003248 9 2008-03-25 0.40 WWTP+SW 3,347,952.13 € 10 0.0000 0.0799 0.1501 0.0572   -0.9548 1.0868 0.1630   
CT08000257 10 2008-03-19 0.40 SW 1,320,041.06 € 25 0.1002 0.1835 0.2508 0.0457 0.0330 -0.4489 0.5560 0.1188 1.1843 
CT08000137  11 2008-03-05 0.40 SW 262,217.31 € 11 0.0539 0.1257 0.2500 0.0647   -1.1308 0.6533 0.1725   
CT07003152 12 2008-02-11 0.40 SW 7,096,107.23 € 43 0.0092 0.1601 0.2860 0.0729   -0.9357 1.1223 0.1903   
CT07003153  13 2008-02-11 0.40 SW 8,229,123.67 € 43 0.0517 0.1901 0.3009 0.0672   -0.7198 0.8989 0.1745   
CT07002641  14 2008-01-28 0.40 WWTP 20,368,617.61 € 12 0.1861 0.2687 0.3505 0.0569   -0.4160 0.4205 0.1510   
CT07002800 15 2008-01-28 0.40 SW 24,811,128.46 € 23 0.2015 0.2734 0.3610 0.0500   -0.4410 0.3619 0.1330   
CT07002802 16 2008-01-28 0.40 SW 11,588,648.39 € 39 0.1571 0.2557 0.3500 0.0559   -0.4956 0.5180 0.1476   
CT07003157 17 2008-01-28 0.40 SW 432,624.04 € 18 0.0370 0.1569 0.2525 0.0566   -0.7234 0.9063 0.1480   
CT07002822 18 2008-01-23 0.40 WWTP 2,279,367.16 € 14 0.1028 0.1854 0.2367 0.0381 0.0700 -0.3398 0.5470 0.0991 1.1416 
CT07002921 19 2008-01-23 0.40 WWTP 4,346,995.62 € 6 0.1818 0.2262 0.2833 0.0383   -0.3268 0.2533 0.1001   
CT07002648 20 2007-12-31 0.40 SW 7,018,943.29 € 45 0.0003 0.1362 0.3282 0.0935   -1.6310 1.1552 0.2470   
CT07002660 21 2007-12-31 0.40 WWTP+SW 1,404,221.70 € 7 0.0290 0.0839 0.1555 0.0453 0.0040 -0.9306 0.7144 0.1279 1.0872 
CT07002721 22 2007-12-31 0.40 SW 1,524,669.38 € 19 0.0950 0.1632 0.2436 0.0398   -0.5885 0.4995 0.1038   
CT07002733 23 2007-12-31 0.40 WWTP 1,309,246.31 € 4 0.0100 0.0374 0.0675 0.0239 -0.0630 -0.8349 0.7614 0.0805 1.1043 
CT07002108  24 2007-12-11 0.40 WWTP 5,208,624.36 € 22 0.0955 0.1765 0.2390 0.0386 0.1210 -0.4301 0.5573 0.1003 1.0674 
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CT07002493 25 2007-12-11 0.40 SW 2,739,723.18 € 25 0.0500 0.2043 0.4062 0.0821   -1.2413 0.9493 0.2134   
CT07002568 26 2007-12-11 0.40 SW 479,663.76 € 9 0.0625 0.0961 0.1600 0.0300   -0.7359 0.3862 0.0829   
CT07001934 27 2007-09-17 0.40 WWTP 6,557,087.95 € 16 0.0325 0.1277 0.2200 0.0530 0.1120 -0.8282 0.8547 0.1409 1.0181 
CT07001972 28 2007-09-17 0.40 WWTP 8,764,690.65 € 10 0.1550 0.2097 0.2800 0.0428   -0.4246 0.3299 0.1112   
CT07002052 29 2007-09-17 0.40 WWTP 6,217,700.13 € 9 0.1489 0.2361 0.2985 0.0561   -0.3459 0.4837 0.1468   
CT07001745 30 2007-08-31 0.40 SW 8,834,150.00 € 27 0.0103 0.1723 0.2818 0.0688   -0.7677 1.1359 0.1792   
CT07001090 31 2007-08-30 0.40 WWTP 1,043,243.40 € 3 0.0000 0.0532 0.1200 0.0611   -1.3241 1.0562 0.1893   
CT07001776 32 2007-08-30 0.40 WWTP+SW 1,722,516.16 € 6 0.0025 0.0613 0.1090 0.0441   -0.8289 1.0219 0.1324   
CT07001903 33 2007-08-30 0.40 WWTP 2,773,494.15 € 9 0.0105 0.0855 0.1500 0.0523 0.0350 -0.8248 0.9592 0.1474 1.0552 
CT07001957 34 2007-08-30 0.40 WWTP 887,544.43 € 9 0.0100 0.1307 0.3741 0.1028 0.2830 -2.1436 1.0622 0.2729 0.8248 
CT07001003 35 2007-08-20 0.40 SW 292,967.46 € 5 0.0192 0.0519 0.1001 0.0297   -0.9811 0.6643 0.0925   
CT07001602 36 2007-08-20 0.40 WWTP 3,489,863.47 € 9 0.0374 0.1199 0.2450 0.0666   -1.1863 0.7816 0.1785   
CT07001042 37 2007-07-23 0.40 WWTP 1,036,119.28 € 3 0.0000 0.0327 0.0582 0.0298   -0.8044 1.0338 0.1037   
CT06002801 38 2007-07-10 0.40 SW 463,533.77 € 12 0.0680 0.1792 0.3414 0.0860   -1.1032 0.7559 0.2237   
CT07001376 39 2007-07-10 0.40 EW 216,541.08 € 5 0.0321 0.0699 0.1102 0.0277   -0.6202 0.5815 0.0809   
CT07000948 40 2007-06-20 0.40 SW 824,723.89 € 12 0.0105 0.1348 0.2079 0.0548   -0.6272 1.0658 0.1450   
CT07000957 41 2007-06-18 0.40 WWTP 1,886,885.84 € 8 0.0576 0.0947 0.1452 0.0256   -0.5885 0.4329 0.0708   
CT07001150 42 2007-06-11 0.40 SW 1,439,520.67 € 20 0.0000 0.1363 0.2641 0.0621   -1.0852 1.1578 0.1642   
CT07000938 43 2007-05-22 0.40 SW 1,928,425.80 € 11 0.0000 0.0849 0.2114 0.0749   -1.6276 1.0928 0.2112   
CT07000944 44 2007-05-22 0.40 SW 330,605.15 € 4 0.0212 0.0676 0.1233 0.0457   -0.8840 0.7367 0.1345   
CT07000884 45 2007-05-17 0.40 SW 2,866,122.06 € 5 0.0121 0.0885 0.1700 0.0661   -1.0099 0.9471 0.1852   
           Average: -0.8506 0.7842 0.1456 1.0797 
           Desvest: 0.3732 0.2820 0.0452 0.1135 
*1 EPW: Economic Proposal's (Bid) Weight in the tender 
*2 WWTP (Construction of Waste Water Treatment Plant/s), SW (Construction of Sewerage System/s), EW (Earthworks) and ELEC (Electric Works). 
 
Table 1: ACA’s Tender Data and Calculations of parabolic expression parameters a, b, c and d 
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Dm 
Dmax  
- desvest Dmax 
Dmax 
+ desvest 
Dmin 
- desvest Dmin 
Dmin 
+ desvest 
σ 
- desvest σ 
σ+ 
desvest 
Do 
- desvest Do 
Do 
+ devest 
Parameter: -1.2237 -0.8506 -0.4774 0.5022 0.7842 1.0662 0.1004 0.1456 0.1908 0.9662 1.0797 1.1932 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0338 -0.0797 -0.1932 
0.0500 0.1081 0.0904 0.0727 0.0261 0.0127 -0.0006 0.0320 0.0464 0.0608 0.0821 -0.0257 -0.1335 
0.1000 0.2101 0.1766 0.1430 0.0548 0.0294 0.0040 0.0366 0.0530 0.0695 0.1304 0.0283 -0.0739 
0.1500 0.3060 0.2584 0.2109 0.0860 0.0500 0.0141 0.0383 0.0555 0.0728 0.1788 0.0823 -0.0142 
0.2000 0.3958 0.3361 0.2764 0.1196 0.0745 0.0294 0.0386 0.0560 0.0734 0.2271 0.1362 0.0454 
0.2500 0.4794 0.4095 0.3395 0.1558 0.1030 0.0501 0.0382 0.0553 0.0725 0.2754 0.1902 0.1051 
0.3000 0.5570 0.4786 0.4003 0.1945 0.1353 0.0761 0.0371 0.0538 0.0705 0.3237 0.2442 0.1648 
0.3500 0.6284 0.5435 0.4586 0.2357 0.1716 0.1074 0.0356 0.0517 0.0677 0.3720 0.2982 0.2244 
0.4000 0.6937 0.6041 0.5146 0.2795 0.2118 0.1441 0.0338 0.0491 0.0643 0.4203 0.3522 0.2841 
0.4500 0.7529 0.6605 0.5682 0.3257 0.2559 0.1861 0.0318 0.0461 0.0604 0.4686 0.4062 0.3437 
0.5000 0.8059 0.7126 0.6194 0.3744 0.3039 0.2335 0.0295 0.0428 0.0561 0.5169 0.4602 0.4034 
0.5500 0.8529 0.7605 0.6682 0.4257 0.3559 0.2861 0.0270 0.0392 0.0514 0.5652 0.5141 0.4631 
0.6000 0.8937 0.8041 0.7146 0.4795 0.4118 0.3441 0.0244 0.0355 0.0465 0.6135 0.5681 0.5227 
0.6500 0.9284 0.8435 0.7586 0.5357 0.4716 0.4074 0.0217 0.0315 0.0413 0.6618 0.6221 0.5824 
0.7000 0.9570 0.8786 0.8003 0.5945 0.5353 0.4761 0.0189 0.0274 0.0359 0.7101 0.6761 0.6420 
0.7500 0.9794 0.9095 0.8395 0.6558 0.6030 0.5501 0.0159 0.0231 0.0303 0.7585 0.7301 0.7017 
0.8000 0.9958 0.9361 0.8764 0.7196 0.6745 0.6294 0.0129 0.0187 0.0245 0.8068 0.7841 0.7614 
0.8500 1.0060 0.9584 0.9109 0.7860 0.7500 0.7141 0.0098 0.0142 0.0186 0.8551 0.8380 0.8210 
0.9000 1.0101 0.9766 0.9430 0.8548 0.8294 0.8040 0.0066 0.0095 0.0125 0.9034 0.8920 0.8807 
0.9500 1.0081 0.9904 0.9727 0.9261 0.9127 0.8994 0.0033 0.0048 0.0063 0.9517 0.9460 0.9403 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Table 2: Representation of parabolic expression of equations 5, 6 and 7 
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Tender Code ID N Dmin Dm Dmax σ Do Dmax est Dmin est σ est Do est 
CT08001116 1 13 0.0000 0.1111 0.2013 0.0589 0.0700 0.1951 0.0337 0.0538 0.0403 
CT07002839 2 4 0.0010 0.0536 0.1149 0.0591 0.1280 0.0967 0.0138 0.0471 -0.0218 
CT08000938 3 14 0.0100 0.0735 0.1476 0.0477   0.1315 0.0201 0.0503   
CT08000941 4 3 0.0902 0.1162 0.1643 0.0417   0.2035 0.0357 0.0541   
CT07002792 5 11 0.0000 0.0748 0.1353 0.0493 -0.1670 0.1337 0.0205 0.0505 0.0011 
CT08000553 6 5 0.0000 0.0421 0.0803 0.0369 -0.1800 0.0764 0.0105 0.0445 -0.0343 
CT08000597 7 6 0.0515 0.0862 0.1515 0.0379 0.0010 0.1533 0.0244 0.0518 0.0134 
CT08000389 8 22 0.0514 0.1813 0.2732 0.0491 0.1170 0.3076 0.0649 0.0560 0.1161 
CT07003248 9 10 0.0000 0.0799 0.1501 0.0572   0.1424 0.0222 0.0511   
CT08000257 10 25 0.1002 0.1835 0.2508 0.0457 0.0330 0.3109 0.0660 0.0560 0.1184 
CT08000137  11 11 0.0539 0.1257 0.2500 0.0647   0.2192 0.0395 0.0547   
CT07003152 12 43 0.0092 0.1601 0.2860 0.0729   0.2746 0.0547 0.0558   
CT07003153  13 43 0.0517 0.1901 0.3009 0.0672   0.3210 0.0693 0.0561   
CT07002641  14 12 0.1861 0.2687 0.3505 0.0569   0.4359 0.1146 0.0548   
CT07002800 15 23 0.2015 0.2734 0.3610 0.0500   0.4424 0.1176 0.0547   
CT07002802 16 39 0.1571 0.2557 0.3500 0.0559   0.4176 0.1064 0.0552   
CT07003157 17 18 0.0370 0.1569 0.2525 0.0566   0.2693 0.0531 0.0557   
CT07002822 18 14 0.1028 0.1854 0.2367 0.0381 0.0700 0.3138 0.0670 0.0560 0.1205 
CT07002921 19 6 0.1818 0.2262 0.2833 0.0383   0.3750 0.0889 0.0558   
CT07002648 20 45 0.0003 0.1362 0.3282 0.0935   0.2363 0.0440 0.0551   
CT07002660 21 7 0.0290 0.0839 0.1555 0.0453 0.0040 0.1493 0.0236 0.0515 0.0109 
CT07002721 22 19 0.0950 0.1632 0.2436 0.0398   0.2794 0.0561 0.0558   
CT07002733 23 4 0.0100 0.0374 0.0675 0.0239 -0.0630 0.0681 0.0092 0.0433 -0.0393 
CT07002108  24 22 0.0955 0.1765 0.2390 0.0386 0.1210 0.3001 0.0625 0.0560 0.1109 
CT07002493 25 25 0.0500 0.2043 0.4062 0.0821   0.3426 0.0768 0.0560   
CT07002568 26 9 0.0625 0.0961 0.1600 0.0300   0.1700 0.0280 0.0527   
CT07001934 27 16 0.0325 0.1277 0.2200 0.0530 0.1120 0.2225 0.0404 0.0547 0.0582 
CT07001972 28 10 0.1550 0.2097 0.2800 0.0428   0.3506 0.0797 0.0560   
 27 
CT07002052 29 9 0.1489 0.2361 0.2985 0.0561   0.3896 0.0947 0.0556   
CT07001745 30 27 0.0103 0.1723 0.2818 0.0688   0.2936 0.0605 0.0559   
CT07001090 31 3 0.0000 0.0532 0.1200 0.0611   0.0961 0.0137 0.0470   
CT07001776 32 6 0.0025 0.0613 0.1090 0.0441   0.1102 0.0162 0.0485   
CT07001903 33 9 0.0105 0.0855 0.1500 0.0523 0.0350 0.1520 0.0242 0.0517 0.0126 
CT07001957 34 9 0.0100 0.1307 0.3741 0.1028 0.2830 0.2273 0.0416 0.0549 0.0614 
CT07001003 35 5 0.0192 0.0519 0.1001 0.0297   0.0937 0.0133 0.0468   
CT07001602 36 9 0.0374 0.1199 0.2450 0.0666   0.2096 0.0371 0.0544   
CT07001042 37 3 0.0000 0.0327 0.0582 0.0298   0.0597 0.0079 0.0418   
CT06002801 38 12 0.0680 0.1792 0.3414 0.0860   0.3043 0.0638 0.0560   
CT07001376 39 5 0.0321 0.0699 0.1102 0.0277   0.1252 0.0189 0.0498   
CT07000948 40 12 0.0105 0.1348 0.2079 0.0548   0.2340 0.0433 0.0550   
CT07000957 41 8 0.0576 0.0947 0.1452 0.0256   0.1677 0.0275 0.0526   
CT07001150 42 20 0.0000 0.1363 0.2641 0.0621   0.2365 0.0440 0.0551   
CT07000938 43 11 0.0000 0.0849 0.2114 0.0749   0.1510 0.0240 0.0516   
CT07000944 44 4 0.0212 0.0676 0.1233 0.0457   0.1212 0.0182 0.0495   
CT07000884 45 5 0.0121 0.0885 0.1700 0.0661   0.1571 0.0252 0.0520   
       R: 0.8885 0.8476 0.4310 0.5400 
       R^2: 0.7895 0.7185 0.1858 0.2916 
 
Table 3: Calculations of Correlation Factor (R) and Quadratic Correlation Factor (R2) for each Parabolic regression curve 
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